PHILADELPHIA, PA – In the carefully orchestrated ecosystem of college basketball, the early season schedule presents a curious paradox. While powerhouse programs from the Big 10, Big 12, Atlantic Coast and Southeastern Conferences rack up victories in their gleaming arenas, small schools from conferences like the MEAC, MAAC, and NEC often start their seasons with win-loss records of 0-7 or 1-8. These are not accidents of fate, but the result of a calculated, financial arrangement known as the “buy game”—a practice that is both a lifeline for the struggling and a cornerstone for the elite, revealing the stark economic realities of modern college athletics.
In this unspoken bargain, high-major programs pay low-major counterparts anywhere from $70,000 to $120,000 to visit their home courts. The terms are clear: the visiting team gets a check; the host gets an almost guaranteed victory. For elite programs, these games are a strategic necessity, allowing them to pile up six, seven, or even eight Division I wins before entering the crucible of league play, padding their records and building momentum. For the low-majors, the calculus is different. As one financial officer at a mid-major program put it, “We run thin. There is not a lot of fat” . The revenue from these games—which can total as much as $600,000 for a school’s athletic department over a season—is not a luxury; it is a essential subsidy that keeps entire sports programs afloat
This financial lifeline, however, comes with a profound competitive toll, warping seasons, stymying coaching careers, and creating a distorted landscape where teams often have no true sense of their own identity.
The High-Major Calculus: Buying Wins and Building Brands
From the perspective of the nation’s basketball blue bloods, buy games are a rational and efficient investment. They represent a controlled environment to integrate new players, experiment with lineups, and build team chemistry without the immediate threat of a season-damaging loss. In an era where a missed NCAA tournament can mean a significant financial and reputational setback, these guaranteed wins help ensure that a team’s resume is robust enough to catch the eye of the selection committee come March.
Here’s a breakdown of how many teams from each of those conferences (ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, SEC) made the 2025 men’s NCAA basketball tournament.
| Conference | Number of teams in 2025 NCAA Tournament |
| ACC | 4 |
| Big Ten | 8 |
| Big 12 | 7 |
| SEC | 14 |
The financial outlay, while substantial, is a manageable line item for Power 4 conference schools, which boast operating revenues averaging $97 million in the ACC, for example. For them, the cost of a buy game is easily offset by the revenue from a single home game, which includes ticket sales, concessions, and sponsorships. Furthermore, in the new world of revenue sharing and Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL), where schools are directing $20.5 million annually directly to athletes, the pressure to maintain a winning program—and the financial windfall that comes with deep tournament runs—has never been greater. A successful season built on a foundation of early wins helps drive the brand engagement that underpins these massive financial operations.
The Low-Major Struggle: Survival and Sacrifice
For low- and mid-major programs, the decision to be a “buy team” is a Faustian bargain, balancing financial survival against competitive integrity. The revenue from these games is often the difference between solvency and severe cutbacks. As detailed in a 2020 report, the University of Montana projected a $5 million shortfall in its athletic budget, making the $75,000 to $95,000 earned from a single buy game against a Power 4 school a critical part of its financial planning. This money is used not for luxuries, but for fundamental needs—subsidizing coaching salaries, funding travel for conference play, and paying for equipment
However, this financial lifeline comes at a steep cost.
- The Psychological Toll: Teams are conditioned to accept losing as a prelude to their “real” season—conference play. This can be demoralizing for players and coaches who, despite their talent and preparation, are thrust into mismatches night after night.
- The Physical Toll: The travel is often grueling. Montana’s team, for instance, sometimes endures trips through two or three airports to reach a game, or marathon 13-hour bus rides to save costs, all while facing the prospect of a lopsided defeat.
- A System of Dependence: This model creates a dependency, making it difficult for these programs to escape their subordinate status. The financial incentive to schedule these games can outweigh the competitive incentive to build a balanced schedule that could lead to more wins and long-term growth.
The Sacrifice: A Schedule Built on Blowouts
The brutal reality of this bargain is etched in the season records of teams like Coppin State and Rider University. Consider Coppin State’s schedule heading into its recent game against Rider:
- vs Maryland: L 83-61
- @ La Salle: L 87-59
- @ James Madison: L 84-70
- @ South Florida: L 100-50
- vs Central Michigan: L 82-59
- vs South Alabama: L 72-62
- vs Central Penn: W 103-62 (a non-Division I opponent)
- @ VCU: L 101-58
Rider’s path was similarly grim before the two teams met:
- @ Virginia: L 87-53
- @ Rutgers: L 81-53
- vs Eastern: W 86-54 (a non-Division I opponent)
- @ Texas: L 99-65
- @ Houston: L 91-45
These are not just losses; they are systematic dismantlings. The differences in athleticism, strength, and size are so vast that the games become less a contest and more an economic exercise. For the players on the losing end, it is a grueling and demoralizing rite of passage, a season that begins with accepting defeat as a precursor to their “real” season in conference play.
The Coaching Conundrum: A Career Stuck in Quicksand
This system creates a particularly vexing problem for ambitious low-major coaches. Their career advancement depends on winning percentages and postseason success. Yet, they are forced to begin every season with a gauntlet of near-certain losses, cratering their overall record before they ever play a peer opponent.
How can a coach prove their program-building mettle when their team is structurally scheduled to start 0-7? The buy game phenomenon acts as a ceiling, trapping talented coaches in a cycle where achieving a strong winning percentage is a mathematical improbability. Their resumes are hamstrung from the outset, making the leap to a higher-profile job significantly more difficult, regardless of their actual coaching acumen.
An Ecosystem at a Crossroads
The buy game system is a microcosm of the broader inequities in college athletics, a landscape where the financial disparity is staggering. A single Power 5 conference, the SEC, generated $1.89 billion in revenue in 2018, a figure that eclipsed the $1.38 billion generated by the entire Football Championship Subdivision, a group of over 100 schools that includes many low-major basketball programs. This chasm is now being codified in new ways, as the advent of revenue sharing and large-scale NIL deals creates what some have called a “pay for play” tier, potentially relegating mid- and low-majors to a permanently lower competitive status.
The pros and cons from each perspective can be summarized as follows:
| Perspective | Pros | Cons |
| High-Major Program | – Nearly guaranteed victories for record-building – Low-risk environment for team development- Protects lucrative postseason prospects | – Financial cost of guarantee payments – Risk of player injury in a mismatch- Can be criticized for lack of competitive scheduling |
| Low-Major Program | – Essential revenue for athletic department survival ($600k+/season) – Funds travel, salaries, and operational costs – Opportunity for players to compete in a high-profile environment | – Demoralizing starts to the season (0-7, 1-8 records) – Grueling travel and physical toll on players – Perpetuates a cycle of financial and competitive dependency |
Yet, even as this system entrenches inequality, it is also being challenged by the same market forces that sustain it. Low-major programs are being forced to find creative revenue streams, from hosting concerts in their facilities to pursuing novel licensing deals for branded merchandise. Some analysts argue that the coming restructuring of college sports might, ironically, offer these schools a way out—freeing them from an unwinnable financial arms race and allowing them to refocus on their educational mission.
The Distortion: Who Are We, Really?
Perhaps the most subtle yet damaging effect of the buy game system is the competitive distortion it creates. When Coppin State and Rider finally faced each other, they did so with a combined 2-12 record. Their lone wins came against non-Division I schools.
They had no true idea how good or bad their teams were. How do you gauge your defensive schemes after being overwhelmed by Virginia’s size or Houston’s speed? How do you assess your offense after facing defenses with a level of length and athleticism you will never see in your own conference? The games against high-majors are so different in kind, not just degree, that they offer little actionable data for the games that ultimately matter—the conference matchups that determine a chance at the NCAA tournament.
An Uneasy, Enduring Symbiosis
Despite its clear downsides, this ecosystem is remarkably stable. The high-majors have no incentive to change a system that provides them with wins, revenue, and a soft launch to their season. The low-majors, trapped by financial necessity, cannot afford to walk away from the checks.
The buy game is the purest expression of college basketball’s economic hierarchy. It is a transaction that funds dreams at one school by monetizing the competitive hopes of another. For every check that clears, a season is warped, a coach’s record is tarnished, and a team is left to wonder about its own identity until it finally steps onto a court against an opponent its own size. The games will go on, the standings will tell two different stories, and the unspoken bargain will continue to define the sport, for better and for worse.
The Black Cager 